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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
ROBERT BELCHER, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 
12077 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with assault on a guard with 
malice aforethought while serving time in the State Prison. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-65-1 (Supp. 1969), ap-
pellant requested final disposition of the 3ISIS3.Ult charge. 
Before the period for bringing the case to trial had 
elapsed, the State moved for a continuance, whJich motion 
was granted. 
Appellant withdrew his plea of not guilty and entered 
a plea of guilty to the crime of assault on a guard with a 
deadly weapon but without malii.ce aforethought. Judgment 
was based on the guilty plea of the lesser included crime. 
Appellant appeals from the judgment on the grounds 
that the trial court was without jurisdiction of the matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-65-2 (Supp. 1969). 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On December 8, 1969, which wa..s within ninety days 
of appellant's request for fiinal disposition, the Third Dis-
trict Court, the Honorable D. Frank Wilklins, presiding, 
granted the State's motion to extend the time for disposing 
of case at bar pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-65-1 (Supp. 
1969). 
Subsequently, appellant entered a guilty plea to the 
crime of assault on a guard without malice aforethought, 1 
a lesser criime than that with which he was charged, and 
was sentenced to the Utah State Prison for the 1indetermin-
ate term as provided by law, the sentence to commence at 
termination of prior sentence being served. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent submits that the judgment of the trial 
court was properly entered while court had jur1isdiction of 
the matter and that therefore, the judgment should be 
affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant was sentenced and committed to the Utah 
State P:vison in 1967 for the crime of burglary [n the second 
degree. While serving the burglary sentence, appellant 
stabbed a guard and was charged with the crime of assault 
with malice aforethought (R. 6). 
On September 19, 1969, appellant fiiled notice and re-
quest for final disposition of the assault charge pending 
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3 
against hlim, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-65-1 (Supp. 
1969) (R. 10). 
On December 8, 1969, which was within ninety days 
of appellant's request for final disposition, the State made 
a motion to continue the case to some date beyond the 
ninety day period. The court granted the motion and set 
trial for January 26, 1970. 
The prosecutor indicated that he would be happy to 
try the case within the ninety day period, but circumstances 
of the case made a continuance necessary. The difficulties 
in handling the case withiin the ninety day period involved 
appellant's recent notice of insanity plea, and a crowded 
calendar. The court was very much aware of the statute 
requiring a disposal of a matter within ninety days from 
request for disposal, unless good cause is shown for con-
tinuance (R. 39). The court found good cause for a con-
tinuance and set the trial date beyond the ninety day period. 
Subsequently, appellant entered a plea of guilty to the 
crime of assault on a guard with a deadly weapon but with-
out malice aforethought, a lesser crime than that with 
which appellant was originally charged. Appellant was sen-
tenced to serve an tindeterminate term in prison, the sen-
tence to commence at the conclusion of present sentence (R. 
26). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION BE-
YOND NINETY DAYS FROM FILING OF RE-
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QUEST FOR DISPOSITION AND DID NOT 
ERR IN SENTENCING DEFENDANT IN 
THAT PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANN. § 
77-65-1 (SUPP. 1969), THE COURT GRANTED 
A NECEISSARY AND REASONABLE CONTIN-
UANCE FOR A GOOD CAUSE. 
The issue revolves around Utah Code Ann. § § 77-65-1 
and 77-65-2 (Supp. 1969). The statutes provide in part: 
" ... that for a good cause shown in open court, 
the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court 
having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any 
necessary or reasonable continuance." Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-65-1 (Supp. 1969). (Emphasis added.) 
"In the event that the action is not brought to 
trial within the period of time as herein provided, 
no court of this state shall any longer have juris-
diction thereof, nor shall the untri.ed iindictment, 
information or complaint be of any further force or 
effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing 
the same with prejudice.1' Utah Code Ann. § 77-65-2 
(Supp. 1969). 
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that the legisla-
ture, by passing these istatutes, intended to put the burden 
of compliance upon the prosecutor. However, the prosecu-
tor, WlithJin the ninety day period, for good cause, may move 
for a continuance beyond the period proscribed. State v. 
Wilson, 1453 P. 2d 158, 22 U. 2d 361 (1969). 
The Utah high court stated that the purpose of the 
statute is "to more precisely define what is meant by 
'speedy trial' as that term is used in the constitutions of 
the variious states." Id. at 363. 
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The Uniited States Supreme Court: 
" ... has consfatently been of the view that 
' [ t] he right of a speedy trial is necessarily relative. 
It is consistent with delays and depends upon cir-
cumstances. It secures rights to a defendant. It 
does not preclude the rights of public justice.' [Ci-
tation omitted.] 'Whether delay in completing a 
prosecution ... amounts to an unconstitutional dep-
rivation of rights depends upon the circumstances 
... The delay must not be purposeful or oppressive.' 
[Oitatfon omitted.] '[T]he essential ingredient iis 
orderly expedition and not mere speed.'" United 
States v. Ewell, 383 U. S. 116, 120 (1966). 
The reasoning of the United States Supreme Court 
concerning speedy trial may be applied to case at bar. Cir-
cumstances justified continuance; announcement by appel-
lant of his insanity defense and the crowded calendar jus-
tified continuance to a reasonable date. No rights of de-
fendant were prejudiced. The delay was not purposeful or 
oppressive. There was orderly expedition. Request for con-
tinuance was reasonably made and was in compliance with 
the appropriate statute. 
The case at bar can be distinguished from State v. 
Wilson, supra. In case at bar, the prosecutor moved for a 
continuance beyond the period proscribed. The motion was 
made within the ninety day period, and was based upon good 
cause shown in open court. The facts fall well within the 
constitutional standard of r1ight to a speedy trial, the Utah 
statute, and Utah case law. 
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The judge did not abuse his discretion in granting the 
continuance. Regarding continuance, the United States 
Supreme Court has stated that it "is traditionally within 
the discretion of the trial judge .... " Ungar v. Sarafite, 
376 u. s. 575, 589 (1964). 
The states are in accord that continuance in a criminal 
matter ~s within the discretion of the trial court and shall 
not be disturbed unless exercise of the discretion has been 
prejudicial to the substantial rights of the defendant. Beets 
v. State, 449 P. 2d 903 (Oki. Cr. 1969); Lofton v. People, 
450 P. 2d 638 (Colo. 1969); Morford v. State, 3915 P. 2d 861 
(Nev. 1964); People v. Douglas, 392 P. 2d 964 (Cal. 1964); 
Shelton v. Lamb, 460 P. 2d 1'56 (Nev. 1969); State v. Coch-
ran, 447 P. 2d 520 (N. M. 1968); State v. Gager, 370 P. 2d 
739 (Hawaii 1962); State v. Mathis, 319 P. 2d 134, 7 U. 
2d 100 (U. 1957); State v. Polson, 448 P. 2d 229 (Ida. 
1969); State v. Towner, 446 P. 2d 719 (Kan. 1968). 
The continuance granted in case at bar resulted in no 
prejudice to appellant, and was not an abuse of the court's 
discretion. Appellant was allowed to enter a guilty plea 
to a lesser crime than that with which he was originally 
charged. Comm~tment was on the guilty plea to the lesser 
crime, which resulted in a less severe sentence than would 
have been imposed had appellant been convicted for the 
crime charged. There was no prejudice to appellant be-
cause of the delay. 
Furthermore, appellant cannot rightfully complain 
that he was not brought to trial within the ninety day 
period, where he pleaded guilty. Entering a guilty plea 
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waives right to trial. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U. S. 
459 ( 1969). 
CONCLUSION 
The continuance was granted pursuant to the statute. 
Appellant was not prejudiced. Therefore, the court did not 
abuse 1its discretion in granting the continuance. The court 
had jurisdiction at the time it passed judgment and con-
victed appellant. 
Furthermore, the facts of the case at bar place the 
case well within the constitutional standard regarding right 
to a speedy trial, and within Utah case law. 
Thus, nelither statutory nor constitutional rights were 
violated. The respondent, therefore, requests that the trial 
court's judgment be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
LAUREN N. BEASLEY 
Chief Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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